Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
Sociology & Criminology Faculty Publications

Sociology & Criminology Department

6-1995

System, Society and Dominance Effects in Cross-National
Organizational Analysis
Chris Smith
Aston University

Peter F. Meiksins
Cleveland State University, p.meiksins@csuohio.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clsoc_crim_facpub
Part of the Work, Economy and Organizations Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!

Publisher's Statement
(c) 1995 SAGE Publications
Original Citation
Chris Smith, Peter Meiksins. (1995). System, Society and Dominance Effects in Cross-National
Organisational Analysis. Work Employment and Society, 9, 2, 241-267.

Repository Citation

Smith, Chris and Meiksins, Peter F., "System, Society and Dominance Effects in Cross-National Organizational
Analysis" (1995). Sociology & Criminology Faculty Publications. 84.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clsoc_crim_facpub/84
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology & Criminology Department at
EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology & Criminology Faculty Publications by
an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
library.es@csuohio.edu.

SYSTEM, SOCIETY AND DOMINANCE EFFECTS IN CROSSNATIONAL ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS
Chris Smith, Aston University
Peter Meiksins, Cleveland State University

This article was originally published in:
Smith, Chris and Peter Meiksins (1995). System, Society and Dominance Effects in Cross-National
Organisational Analysis. Work Employment Society, 9(2), 241-267.
Post-print standardized by MSL Academic Endeavors, the imprint of the Michael Schwartz Library
at Cleveland State University, 2013

Abstract: Current cross-national organisational theory remains tied to stark
polarisation between convergence and divergence, universal and relative, frames of
analysis. Attempts at synthesis between these forces allow for, but do not always
explain, why the organisation of work should be constantly pressured to conform
to one particular 'best practice'. Our approach examines three sources of external
influence on work organisation practices: (i) the economic mode of production; (ii)
national legacies and institutional patterns; and (iii) 'best practice' or universal
modernisation strategies generated and diffused by the 'society-in-dominance'
within the global economy at a particular period of time. In other words, the
influences upon work within a particular country are the result of a three-way
interaction of what we call system effects, societal effects and dominance effects. All
societies are marked by these three influences, although the order of influence
varies historically and between societies.

SYSTEM, SOCIETY AND DOMINANCE
EFFECTS IN CROSS-NATIONAL
ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS
Chris Smith and Peter Meiksins
Introduction
Recent comparative studies of labour and management across European
societies, debates on the diffusion of Japanese working practices, and those
around 'new production concepts' have highlighted the competing pressures of convergence and divergence in industrial societies. Are organisational methods and theories culture-bound or culture free? Can supposedly
'Japanese' practices transfer to other societies? Are we entering a new era of
'post-fordism' or a pluralistic phase of national and regional organisa-tional
diversity? These questions, with their different objects, levels and units of
analysis highlight the need for theoretical clarity in cross-national
organisational research. They also suggest that tensions between divergence
and convergence, noted in earlier comparative research discussed below, are
being re-invented and repeated in the new discourse of cross-national
leartling and diffusion largely inspired by the decline of American economic
hegemony and the spectacular growth of Japan. Our objective in this paper
is to develop a model for comparative organisational analysis which will
clarify the new and old debates and propose a method for explaining and

exploring cross-national differences through a synthesis of the forces of
convergence and divergence.
Cross-national Divergence and Convergence in Organisations

The dominant schools within classical management thought and organisational sociology assumed efficiency imperatives created 'one best way' of
managing irrespective of cultural or national context. Taylor, Barnard and
Mayo sought to develop universal management principles which, although
influenced in terms of their implementation by national differences, would
be generally used as single 'best practices'. Whatever differences in organising existed between societies would, over time, be subsumed by superior
general efficiency methods and practices. At a macro-level, the convergence
theory of Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers (1960) suggested that, despite
differing routes into 'industrial society', work within it would
look increasingly similar. This was because science and technology were
universal ingredients of all 'industrial societies', and the long term solvents
of national and cultural differences.
Contingency theory argued that firm structure and social relations were
largely free from cultural influence. Authors subscribing to a contingency
perspective assumed that the task environment, product market, size of
firm, its form and structure or its production technology were the key
influences on management, occupational structure and work organisation;
and that these 'contingents' were 'culture-free' (Chandler 1962; Blauner
1964; Woodward 1965; Hickson et al. 1979).
Classical management theory, convergence and contingency perspectives
could not, however, explain the persistence of significant national organisational and social differences across 'industrial' societies, except perhaps in
terms of lags and dubious notions of 'backwardness'. Cross-national
research which held constant economy, technology, product, firm size and
other task 'contingents' found underlying differences in labour processes,
occupational structures and management styles that could only be attributed to the persistence of national differences and the unique attitudes
these generated (Gallie 1978; Child and Keiser 1979; Maurice, Sellier and
Silvestre 1979; Maurice, Sorge and Warner 1980). Such cross-national
organisational research provoked a re-evaluation of the role played by
political economic systems, history, tradition and culture in sustaining
diversity within organisations across different societies.
However, such approaches were not without problems. Difficulties in
operationalising such pervasive and slippery concepts as culture and
tradition - what to include and exclude - resulted in critical analysis shifting to the agencies of social reproduction responsible for imparting national
messages to each generation of workers and managers: namely, social
institutions. State and civil institutions, such as education, vocational

training patterns, occupational formations, employment relations and trade
unions were identified as transmitting distinct identities, qualifications,
skills and training to German, French and British managers and workers
who, in tum, carried these competencies and attitudes into the workplace
to sustain national variance. At the level of the organisation, these 'institutionalist' accounts of national distinctiveness rested on supply-side assumptions that organisations are largely determined by their inputs: different
ingredients producing different national cakes. At the macro-level, they
suggest that the constitution of the firm and its relationship to banks, the
state and other political and economic actors are socially constructed within
different national environments. The rise of institutionalist explanations for
cross-national organisational variance represents a bringing into focus of the
state and an associated playing down of the power of the economy,
technology and the market. Nation states and national history sustain
differences, while the economy promotes the cosmopolitan. However, as
all economies exist within nation states, diversity is normal. Economic
exigencies are mediated by national institutions, yielding different ways in
which managers and workers relate to each other, their firms and their
integration into the wider society.
Institutional analysis tended to focus on and reinforce national differences. The immediate problem with this perspective was to explain the
dynamic nature of change within economies which are increasingly global,
not nationally bounded systems. If British management reflects British
social and economic institutions, how does the nationality of the firm
influence this equation? Are British managers in Japanese or American
Transnational Companies (INCs) in Britain different in style, authority
and attitude because of firm ownership? Is the management style Japanese
or British?
Highlighting the institutions of a specific nation state reinforces a
tendency to make them appear permanent, stable forces of social reproduction. This is untenable in an era of internationalisation of capital, when
open economies, like the British, become home to powerful TNCs from
more dominant economies, like that of Japan or the U.S. Conversely, there
is also the opposite problem in treating some national systems as 'models',
and hence removing them from historical evolution and elevating them to
standards against which to judge other societies. This is especially the case
with comparative analysis between economically dominant and weaker
states. Hence, the U.S., Germany and Japan are most frequently used as
'models'. They are treated as 'modem' and 'given'; their historical evolution
has all but ceased, as they provide 'best practice' ideals from which
other societies can borrow and learn. For some writers, especially North
American enthusiasts for 'Japanese' production, discussed below, other
societies create competitive imperatives which fuel pressures for borrowing
and diffusion, if not 'convergence'. By transposing national patterns of

organisation into 'models', institutional analysis reverts back to 'one best
way' and convergence theory - which was, after all, premised on the rest of
the world copying the U.S. Hence, we can say there is an ambiguous attitude
toward divergence and convergence pressures within institutional analysis.
Institutionalists identified a critical weakness in convergence/one best way
approaches: their inability to explain the persistence of significant national
differences in economic organisations over long periods of time. They
shifted organisational research towards comparative, cross-national studies
which focused on the sources of national differences. However, these
exercises in comparison analysis tended to let a kind of universalism in
through the back door- certain national practices were held up as 'models'
of 'best practice'. The debate about convergence/divergence was not
resolved. The persistent ambivalence of organisational theorists regard- ing
these opposing dynamics is revealed by a review of recent comparative,
cross-national approaches.

New Debates and Old Problems
Comparative cross-national approaches currently have two dominant
schools. First, there are a variety of writers pursuing research on universalism and organisational contingency theory, supported by the diffusion of
new methods of production and organisation inspired partially by Japan and
the spread ofJapanese investment abroad. Second, there are writers inspired
by what we have called the 'institutionalist' or societal effects approach,
examining the nature of national business systems and societal differences
in work organisation. In the following section, we examine these two
schools, focusing on their combined inability to resolve the
convergence/divergence problem in a coherent way.

From Japan to 'new production concepts'
The debate around what some German industrial sociologists have called
'new production concepts' (Kern and Schumann 1984) has highlighted the
tensions between universally applicable models of new methods and
standards of production, and persisting divergences between countries. This
debate has powerful European (especially German) and North American
enthusiasts, and is cast as a reaction to the work of Braverman ( 197 4) on
de-skilling and Taylorism as an intrinsically capitalist or systemic feature of
all industrial societies. Within the post-Braverman debate, both national
variations in the organisation of the labour process and systemic alternatives
to Taylorism were central. However, there has been a tension between these
two positions, with American authors, in the main, choosing to promote
universal post-fordist and post-Taylorist prescriptions and panaceas,

whereas European writers have either insisted that there has been no 'end
to mass production' (typical of British writing) or suggested distinctly
national forms of diversity, as in the 'Swedish' model of car production (for
example Berggren 1992).
American Writing

In the U.S. there has been discussion of 'new production concepts'whether as 'high tech cottage industry', 'flexible specialisation', 'lean
production' or 'innovation-mediated production'. Italy and Japan have
featured strongly as societal templates for new innovations towards 'postfordism'. Sabel (1982) initially identified 'the end of mass production' as
occurring in central Italy and tied to quite specific national and local
political conditions. However, in his book with Piore in 1984, the term
'flexible specialisation' (borrowed from an Italian economist) was projected
as a universal, not local, framework through which to interpret global
changes in the organisation of work. In other words, while Italian production diversity assisted thinking -about differences in labour process
organisation, very quickly a universal 'one best way' typology was constructed as a recipe for the design of production under other economic,
social and political conditions (Smith 1989).
In the American debate on Japan we can identify a similar process.
American writers interpreting Japanese patterns of organisation identified
standards, practices and methods which were transferable to the West as
neutral organisational innovations (Vogel 1979; Ouchi 1981; Pascale and
Athos 1981). In the recent wave of writing on Japanese foreign direct
investment in the U.S., the manufacture of universal concepts, such as 'lean
production' (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990) or 'innovation-mediated
production' (Kenney and Florida 1993) follows a similar pattern of
constructing neutral organisational paradigms.
Womack et al. (1990: 242) are explicitly concerned with the diffusion of
what they consider to be a new production paradigm, which they claim is
not equal to Japanese production. It just so happens that everything about
'lean production' is taken from the Japanese experience. They say it
developed at Toyota and then spread to other Japanese companies at home
and in the United States; they consider themselves pilgrims spreading
the gospel of 'lean production' and, as such, their analysis follows the
well-trodden paths of Taylor and others in the American tradition of
promulgating universal rational prescriptions for regulating work. This
disconnecting of 'lean production' from the institutional supports and
context of Japanese society has been criticised by Abo (1994: 286) and
others. Within their model there is no room for national adaptation, local
variation or alternatives to 'lean production'. As Berggren (1992: 17) has
noted, their 'prescription' is that 'the West must adopt the Japanese

production system lock, stock and barrel and [they] explicitly warn against
any attempts at modification'. As with their account of the diffusion of
'fordism' to Europe, the idea of local adaptation or innovation, or national
variation, is considered a dilution or weakening of the integrity of the
universal practice. For example, they explicitly dismiss the 'British system
of mass production' (Womack et al. 1990: 235) as a feeble alternative to
'fordism', a result of the poorly-educated managers, unstable domestic
demand, adversarial labour relations and the persistence of piece-work.
Kenney and Florida have written explicitly against culturalism and in
favour of contingency theories of organisational diffusion in relation to the
Japan debate (Florida and Kenney 1991). They initially attempted to
capture the nature of the Japanese production system through the term
'Fujitsuism' - derived from Japan's largest computer company (and developed to emphasise variance from autos and Toyotism), the sector and
company taken as symbols of Japanese practices (Kenney and Florida
1988). More recently, they moved towards more universalistic organisational terminology with their concept of 'innovation-mediated production'
(IMP) - the tight integration of R & D and production (Kenney and Florida
1993). They, like Womack et al. claim that their production paradigm 'should
not be considered synonymous with the Japanese model' (Kenny and
Florida 1993: 14), but again, is it coincidental that 'Japan- more than any
other nation - has been able to institutionalize and generalize the new model
at the very core of its industrial structure' (15). To be fair, they suggest that
specific variants of IMP will inevitably occur, for the same happened with
'fordism', but such variants are from a typology almost exclusively informed
by the Japanese model and they therefore will look like deviations from a
fixed norm, rather than genuine alternatives (Smith 1994).
In short, American writers struggling to interpret the rise of Japanese
competition and manufacturing decline in the American economy, have
used comparative analysis to abstract organisational standards which can
then be applied as techniques and typologies free from cultural or national
contamination. There has been a pervasive attempt to construct universal
models, even where, as in the debate over Japanese transplanted companies,
these models are synonymous with or reliant upon a single dominant
economy. This has been in contrast to the European debate, where there has
been more stress on adaptation and diversity in production systems.
European Writing

The German debate on the 'end of the division oflabour' or 'post-Taylorist'
interpretations of Japan has shown less inclination to construct new
paradigms, and has paid more attention to 'selection' and 'adaptation' of the
lessons of Japan Gurgens 1989). Moreover, there has been a persistent
critique of the Japanese system as one based on labour compliance and

submission, which has only transferred to the West due to 'tremendous
pressure of labour-market conditions and individual fear of job loss', not
because of 'superior' efficiency standards Gurgens 1989: 218).
Kern and Schumann's (1984) vision of the post-Taylorist future stresses
its contradictory and polarising character - between highly-skilled and
marginal groups - and, despite a spirited scenario for the future, they have
not generated any unconditionally optimistic prescriptions. Within German
industrial sociology there has been a fierce debate around this very limited
post-Taylorist vision, with most authors supporting, as in the French
debate, neo-Taylorist or neo-fordist perspectives which emphasise continuity rather than any radical departure from mass production (Smith
1989). Concepts such as 'systematic rationalisation', for example, developed by the ISF (Institute for Social Science Research) group in Munich,
explicitly link labour process restructuring with capitalist control concerns
and reject a 'paradigmatic change in rationalisation strategy' towards what
Kern and Schumann see as a 'requalification' or 'reprofessionalisation' of
industrial work (Sauer et al. 1992: 52). Kern and Schumann themselves
(1993: 102) in a recent paper appear less optimistic and support the ISF
group in recognising the pervasive and comprehensive rationalisation taking
place in industry, affecting not just production and personnel, but
purchasing, planning, marketing and the location and the integration of
firms. Moreover, through new research they show the further polarisation
between high-tech post-Taylorist labour processes and low-tech Taylorist
ones. In a recent volume, Altmann et al. (1992) reveals the nationally
specific nature of the German debate, and the reluctance to develop
over-arching models which are not tied to national institutions and practice, (that is, a societal context).
This is not to say that European writers dealing with the same concerns
have not tried to generate universal models. More explicitly engaging with
the Japanese model and its mediations through U.S. discourse, Berggren
(1992) has argued for a 'synthesis' between aspects of the Japanese and
Swedish practices - what he calls 'post-lean human-centred production'.
Like German critics, he rejects the labour intensification of the Japanese
system in favour of the humanisation programmes characteristic of some
firms in Sweden; but, theoretically, he shows that the transformation of
Japanese practices into a 'model' prevents evolution and development, and
creates a fetish for practices -]IT, space economy - which are in fact
disappearing in Japan. 'Lean production' is 'out of sync with the current
debate in Japan and, compared to Western [Swedish] "best practice",
presents a regression in terms of working conditions as well as individual
freedom' (Berggren 1992: 17, 253).
Again, there is a stress on critical adaptation, selection and interaction
between practices and national traditions: pluralism, rather than 'one best
way'. At the same time, Sweden - because of unique conditions - has

pioneered alternative social relations at work, which are potentially operational elsewhere, although the contractions between Sweden as unique
instance and as 'model' are not resolved by Berggren. His 'post-lean
human-centred production' system is rather half-hearted, as he seems to be
more aware of the limitations ofthe model than its ability to be generalised
beyond Sweden. Moreover, the closure of the most radically anti-fordist
Volvo plant at Uddevalla, and likely closure of the Kalmar factory, remind
us that the Swedish experience is limited to a particular historical period
rather than being structurally embedded within the society. Volvo's links
with Renault appeared to strengthen the hand of those seeking the
re-introduction of more conventional assembly-line production, bringing
Swedish job reforms into line with European standards, rather than any
movement the other way (Thompson and Sederblad 1994).
British academics have not evolved new models, or attempted to push
'British practice' as a 'new panacea'. The reasons for this are not hard to
fmd: British manufacturing continues to shrink, while foreign multinationals increase their presence and Britain's share of world trade declines
further. The experience in the U.K. has been rather one of critical engagement with prescriptions from the U.S. (see, for example, the generally
hostile attitudes towards flexibility, 'flexible specialisation' and 'new production concepts' in Pollert 1991 and Blyton and Morris 1992). Debate on
Japanese management has tended to retain the national prefix as 'Japanisation', suggesting diffusion, due to the creation of functionally equivalent
institutional and economic supports in Britain for the compliance oflabour
in Japan (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992). However, such a prognosis has also
been severely criticised (see Elger and Smith 1994 for a review). In general,
the stress on the diversity of production, retention rather than the end of
mass production and 'fordist' principles has dominated British debate,
reflecting perhaps the diversity of British industrial structures, the high level
of inward-investment of 'screw-driver' or simple assembly factories, national
hostility to neat typologies and prescriptions, and the role of misplaced
national pride in denying economic decline.
There have, therefore, been different responses to the debate on 'postTaylorism/post-Fordism' and reaction to Japan in Europe and the U.S. Our
review indicates that there are clear tensions between attempts to generate
over-arching, systemic typologies, typical of U.S. writers, and more cautious
stress on diversity, pluralism, selection and adaptation, more typical of
European writers. In none of these texts is anything like a coherent
cross-national comparative theory developed: rather, tensions between
national and universal systems and approaches are produced.

From 'societal effects' to national models
In the 'new production concepts' debate some versions have moved from

national (U.S. and Japan) models to universal paradigms. At the other end
of the debate on cross-national difference is the institutional or 'societal
effects' school, which has recently travelled from a stress on national
diversity to the construction of national 'models'. What do we mean by this?
Initially the work of what Rose (1985) has called the 'Aix Group' of
cross-national researchers suggested that each society was unique, to the
extent that organisational or economic constraints could not reduce the
specific character of social relations or organisations in different countries.
There were no imperatives capable of eliminating national differences. Their
analysis permitted precise and substantive findings on the cultural
difference in business organisations between societies. 'By means of crossnational comparisons of organizational units which were fairly identical with
regard to acknowledged contingencies, this Group has identified quite a
large cross-national variety of organizational forms and practices which
though unrelated to task context or performance difference, is very closely
bound to institutionalized human resources (education, training, work
careers), social stratification and industrial relations' (Sorge 1991: 162).
Despite such a commitment to national organisational pluralism, there
has been a tension between nationally distinct and nationally superior
methods of organising. While insisting on the functional equivalence of
societal patterns in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, Rose (1985: 80)
pointed to a contradiction in the work of the 'Aix Group' between the
societal effects on organisations and more universal forces, ideas and
practices derived from shared economic systems or new technological
developments. For example, examining the utilisation of information
technology across capitalist societies Rose quotes Maurice as saying that
while 'different forms of the division oflabour may lead to comparable levels
of efficiency, it is none the less true that certain systems seem more efficient
than others' (emphasis added). This seems to imply a 'one best way'
approach, as, evidently, 'industrial relationships structured primarily in
terms of competence based on polyvalent training and a spirit of professionality on the German 'model' should permit adaptation much more
readily than others. Does this not suggest that pressures will arise in
societies with very dissimilar industrial relationships to indulge in institutional borrowing?' But Rose (80) adds the rider that so far the 'Aix team
have been reluctant to engage in any such conjectures'.
In the work of British supporters of the 'societal effect' approach (Child
1981; Lane 1989) there has also been an ambivalent attitude towards the
degree of equality between national institutional arrangements and a strong
tendency to elevate all things German to a superior position. In other words,
some societies are clearly turned into models from which other societies can
learn. There is a tension between seeing a plurality of national recipes for
work organisation, all equally effective, and a hierarchy of national
efficiency, with some societies 'better' than others at organising the firm.

National recipes are being constantly measured against each other in terms
of efficiency, and this creates pressures towards standardisation. This
material reality in turn produces the need for a more dynamic and
integrative analysis. Child and Lane, while emphasising the centrality of the
nation state for structuring work organisation, do seek, in both explicit and
implicit ways, to rank societies by non-cultural or structural criteria of
efficiency. Indeed, one of the purposes of comparative analysis in British
hands seems to be to find other societal patterns and practices from which
Britain can borrow, learn, modernise and revitalise 'its' fortunes.
The Unresolved Problem: Between Diversity and Standard Models

The interest in borrowing and cross-national learning in comparative
organisational analysis represents a significant advance on what came
before. However, far from resolving the traditional ambivalence regarding
the convergence/divergence problem, it has reproduced it at a more
complex level of analysis. Even attempts to synthesise the various
approaches reflect this continued theoretical problem.
Child (1981), for example, offered a synthesis in his 'culture, capitalism
and contingency' perspective, which argued that cross-national studies
needed to address cultural and institutional reproduction of diversity,
common social relations given by political economy and pressures and
constraints imposed by contingencies such as technology, scale and market.
Lane (1989) applied this perspective in an evaluation of labour and
management practices and relations in Britain, Germany and France. The
problem with these kinds of study is that one society appears to come to
embody the 'best practice' standards against which others are judged. The
theory, however, cannot explain why this should be the case.
Another synthetic model is the idea of the national 'business system'
(Whitley 1992a, 1992b). This argues that national economies are shaped by
social and economic institutions which can be quite specific to particular
societies and regions; and that, despite pressures for internationalisation
and regionalisation from economic and political co-ordination and control
created by TNCs and the EU or other regional forces, national specificity
continues to be reproduced. This theory borrows heavily from the societal
effects school, while attempting to integrate the forces of internationalisation as they impact on firms, sectors and social institutions. While, for the
societal effects school, each society is irreducible to external exigencies,
business systems writers recognise more complex patterns of interaction,
with dominant economies and more internationalised economic sectors such as oil, autos, electricals - able to create non-national or regional
patterns of business organisations. One problem with the approach is that
externalities within the environment are considered to shape the organisation, and social action within the firm or the labour process is ignored.

Auto studies from MIT and the Wissenschaftszentrum expose differences
between national mass production systems, holding constant industrial
sector, and demonstrate the need to link different levels of analysis in
comparative studies -the sector, dominant trends or dynamics (whether
there is movement away from mass or fordist production) alongside
company differences and national institutional settlements and contexts
Gurgens, Maisch and Dohse 1993; Jurgens 1993). Indeed, this method of
cross-national comparison is superior to the usual two or three country
comparisons between shared sectors, such as Gallie's (1977; 1979) work on
the French and British oil refineries, Dore's (1973) work on British and
Japanese electrical companies and the various Aix Group sector studies of
institutional diversities in Germany, France and Britain. This is because it
theorises and examines, especially in German writing, the multi-national
firm and the idea of new production paradigms and not simply the national
arena of production. However, as our earlier discussion of 'new production
concepts' reveals, there is a strong inclination to elevate one society (the
U.S., Japan) or company (Ford, Toyota) into the position of standardmaker against which other societies or companies are judged and measured.
This reflects a tendency to reproduce 'one best way' thinking, without
showing how this can be integrated with patterns of organisational national
diversity. Following a painstaking dissection of the specificities of work
organisation within car companies in different countries, Jurgens (1993:
122) nevertheless concludes by suggesting the future lies with two country
models, the Japanese or German, or 'a synthesis of the Japanese and
German models; group formation, job integration, and extreme work
efficiency in manual mass production according to the Japanese example;
skilled-worker oriented team formation and professionalisation in the high
technology areas and in the service functions according to the German
model'. While these societies form the extreme benchmarks for work
organisation, they should not be transposed into paradigms which discount
national diversity and specificity.
Although each of the new approaches has strengths and weakness, it is
apparent that none develops an adequate theorisation of the international
determinants of national organisational forms of work. While the international dimension has been acknowledged as a result of the contemporary
discussion of borrowing, best practice and new production concepts, this
has raised more questions than it has answered:
Is it legitimate to convert some nations into 'models', as in the 'Japanese
model', the 'German model', 'Swedish model'? This occurs both explicitly, as in the American version of the 'new production concepts'
debate, and implicitly, as in the tendency to elevate German practices as
standards, in the work of the 'Aix Group',Jurgens et al., Child and Lane.
By constructing these 'models', history is closed.

Can nations be judged as equals? This is especially so in the 'Aix
Group', in their idea of functional equivalent ways of organising within
nation states, rather than ranking efficiency differences. The clear economic differences between nation states means a hierarchy of efficiency
is constantly being reproduced.
What are the circumstances which promote learning? What are the
limits, if any, on the transmission of organisational practice across
national boundaries? And what role do trans-national agencies, such as
TNCs, play in the creation and reproduction of work cultures from one
society to the next?
We need an integrative model of cross-national differences, which is both
able to explain why convergence pressures co-exist with those promoting
diversity, at the same time as separating the precise influence these different
forces have. We need a theory which explains why some societies play the
role as standard-makers, which is clearly evident in the way the U.S. and
Japan are considered, at the same time as recognising the limitations on one
society adopting the standards generated in another. This is what we
propose below.
An Alternative Approach
The main determinants of organisational forms and practice have been
identified in the existing literature on comparative organisations as: the
underlying political economy, which has a country and increasingly international dimension; national social institutions; and global standards and
practices (in the form of imported 'best practice'). Our approach to
cross-national organisational analysis begins with much the same lists of
determinants. However, we seek to integrate them more explicitly and to
theorise more adequately the role of global forces. To be more specific, our
approach differs from existing approaches in two principal ways:
(i) We reject the inherent dualism of most contemporary approaches, in
which the economy is treated as an ahistorical 'structure' existing in tension
with historical national institutions. Instead, we argue that the two must be
seen as inextricably linked aspects of actual national histories. Thus,
economic forces do not predetermine how actual societies will look. Rather,
they create pressures, problems and exigencies which must be 'worked out'
in actual societies. National institutions, thus, are not simply 'obstacles' to
the expansion of these underlying forces. They are, in addition, responses to
these pressures; they both condition and are conditioned by them. In this
sense, one could refer to our approach as a structural contingency approach
to work in organisations.
(ii) We reject the tendency to reduce global forces to the act of 'borrowing' or 'emulating' best practice developed elsewhere. Instead, we contend

that the international economy must be understood as a complex, deeply
integrated system. The way in which individual societies are integrated into
the system, the history of their relationship to it and the dynamics of the
system as a whole help to explain both why 'best practice' occasionally
appear and become candidates for borrowing, and why such borrowing has
not and is unlikely to result in simple convergence.
System Effects

A political economic system, such as capitalism, feudalism or state socialism, contains distinct social relations and forces which impose themselves
upon a country's organisations as a disciplinary mechanism. The role of
markets for co-ordination, the employment relation, the capitalist labour
process, the application of science and technology to production, managerial hierarchies and so forth are relations and practices common to
capitalism as a system. However, these common elements take different
forms: trade unions, for example, exist as interest groups created by waged
labour, but can be organised along occupational, industrial and enterprise
lines, with differing political affiliations and identities, such that similarity of
function does not, in itself, determine the action of trade unions outside of
particular societal contexts.
The word 'system' implies something fixed or automatic, but it is not used
here in that way. This is because all 'modes of production' are social
constructions, and therefore subject to human history, and the historical
process is never fixed or definite. The mode of production suggests an
agenda, sets limits on what may occur, but it cannot predetermine the
outcome or precise history of these conflicts. A mode of production can take
different 'forms' over different historical epochs (for example, personal,
financial and managerial capitalism) but its dynamic social relations, such
as conflict between labour and capital, remain the same. While a mode of
production sets certain parameters or constraints on organisational choice,
it does not, impose standardised behaviour - 'one best way', or 'universal
management principles' or identical institutions for managing conflict and
contradiction.
We can also think of 'systems' as possessing inclusive features, as in
the 'class system', 'innovation system' or 'sex-gender system' or, at the
organisational level, the 'socio-technical system' of contingency theory.
Industrial sectors can be considered as distinct economic sub-systems, with
their own identities, histories and interests (Smith, Child and Rawlinson
1990). Firms can also be seen in systemic terms, the multi-national as a
distinct form of business organisation, or the multi-divisional company. A
recent book on national 'innovation systems' sought to balance the extent
to which technology remained influenced by national political policies,
economies and sectors, and how far it had been 'internationalised' along

global lines, as 'technological communities have become transnational as
never before' (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993: 17). Some sectors exhibited a
more transnational character, such as oil, while others, even where they are
internationalised, exhibit marked national differences in organisation, as in
the differing structures of the U.S. French and Japanese semi-conductor
industries (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993: 18).
Systemic thinking therefore tends to generalise across cultural or national
boundaries. 'The internationalization ofbusiness and technology erodes the
extent to which national borders and citizenship define boundaries that are
meaningful in analyzing technological capabilities and technical advance'
(Nelson and Rosenberg 1993: 17). In itself, such theorising only repeats the
problems already discussed in other universal paradigms. However,
systemic thinking remains a necessary part of any attempt to understand
work organisation or capital-labour relations within any parti- cular society;
but system thinking requires national contexts, and these mediate and
condition systemic dynamics of whatever type.

Societal Effects
Remaining at the macro-level of political economy we can say there are a
variety of societal contexts through which 'modes of production' emerge,
develop and get reproduced. It is a level of institutionalisation which
encultures systemic forces with unique qualities. Structural relationships
characteristic of capitalism or feudalism can only emanate and evolve within
actual societies, most of which possess long histories and pre- existing
institutional arrangements, and therefore create unique intimations to
systemic dynamics of each society.
Institutionalists of the 'Aix Group' and many other social scientists, have,
as discussed earlier, emphasised the importance of 'nations' for mediating
general forces, such as those produced by capitalism. We could be more
specific, and say that the state and the institutions of civil society have
differentially influenced both the emergence and subsequent reproduction
of'capital' within particular territories. This interaction, according to Sorge
(1991) and 'Aix Group' theorists, does not create conformity, as the
globalising effect which may flow from these capitalist dynamics can only
ever fit into the existing divergence of national recipes, and therefore
perpetuate 'non-identical reproduction of existing specificity' . 1 Another way
of saying the same thing, is that internationalisation of capital builds on the
competitive advantages of different countries rather than homo- genising
them. While we see problems with this line of analysis, leading as it does
towards an ultimate denial of the dynamic forces of international capitalism,
we nevertheless recognise the 'societal effects' on capital-labour relations
within the firm. Indeed, it is obvious from any cursory historical assessment

of the nature of work and social relations within societies sharing the same
mode of production, that marked differences persist.
Legacies can be built into any new system from what came before. Gallie
(1983: 206-215) has discussed this as the 'Mann/Giddens' explanation of
radicalism amongst French workers. Trotsky (1967: 22-31) used this as an
explanation for the revolutionary consciousness of Russian workers. Fox
(1985) has examined pre-capitalist forms of market individualism in
English commercial agriculture and its influence on the subsequent character of British capitalism, with its strong emphasis on market contractualism
and weak state collectivism. Meiksins Wood (1991) in a recent 'historical
essay on old regimes and modem states' has highlighted the diverse
historical experience of capitalism. Only in England were feudal property
relations transformed into capitalist ones; while, in most European states,
feudalism was superseded not by capitalism, but absolutism (as was the case
in Germany) and city states (as in Italy). This in turn affected the nature of
capitalist development in these countries. We do not dwell on these issues,
but stress the pertinence of diversity of routes and continuities between old
and new systems against earlier theories of the sweeping away of the past
through industrialisation.
The character of national institutions and work organisation can be
strongly shaped by the past. The ancien regime might even facilitate, rather
than hinder, the growth of the new regime. Meiksins Wood (1991: 16) notes
how the 'survival of archaic forms can promote, rather than impede,
capitalist development - for instance, the availability of bureaucratic stateforms whose interventions can override the inherent contradictions of'pure'
capitalism, or the persistence of cultural forms that underwrite the
deference of workers'. In this way, capitalism as a economic system is
compatible with a variety of political regimes, despite having certain
'democratic' elements (173). In any case, the implication of our own view
of the interaction of 'system effects' and 'societal effects' is that societies are
in a constant state of tension between convergence and divergence. There is
no natural tendency for this tension to be resolved ultimately in favour of
one or the other dynamic. Rather, it is an inherent feature of the historical
process for both dynamics to operate simultaneously within actual societies.
The structural pressures set up by the underlying political economy are real:
however, they are expressed through and conditioned by national histories,
so that simple convergence is an unlikely outcome.

Dominance Effects
It is clear from the history of capitalism that there has always been a
hierarchy between economies, and those in dominant positions have
frequently evolved methods of organising production or the division of

labour which have invited emulation and interest. These 'dominant' societies are deemed to represent 'modernity' or the future, and act, either in
total or through aspects of their system, as a measure of 'progress' and
'development'. Acknowledging this hierarchy between countries complicates the processes of convergence and divergence associated with what we
have identified as system and society effects.
The idea of 'best practice' and borrowing between societies seems
common to the history of methods of organising work, but has accelerated
with the increasing integration of economic activity. This process needs to
be placed within a larger context if we are to answer such questions as why
some countries, but not others, act as benchmarks for general efficiency.
Moreover, how the techniques and practices exported from these particular
countries interact with national institutional arrangements, and what
hastens and impedes their diffusion, also requires further investigation.
We can refine this idea of dominance by examining the conditions
creating best practice. Clearly economic performance against other societies qualifies a country receiving special attention, and through its operation
in the international economy facilitates the diffusion of its practices to other
societies. A dominant society's economic strengths may be in industries
which are prone to internationalised production - such as mass production
goods. It is not surprising that mass production industries such as autos and
electricals have dominated typologies of 'best practice' for manu- facturing.
These sectors are more internationalised, and have therefore acted as
transfer mechanisms for global standards - whether as Fordism, Toyotism,
Fujitsuism, 'lean production' or whole nation standards such as in the idea
of 'Japanisation'. The U.S. and Japanese economies are power- fully placed
in these sectors, and it has been through them that notions of 'best practice'
have developed and become generalised.
Dominance is mediated by the timing of a country's entry into international capitalism, as conditions in the system differ over time and these in
turn select some country or strategy of industrialisation, while rejecting
others. Timing can be examined in several ways. Firstly, by discussing the
'niches' available for countries to enter. While industrialisation has a
developmental sequence by sector - countries move from labour-intensive
to technology and capital-intensive industries - these also change, as the
international division of labour and growth of export processing zones
affects low-tech sectors such as clothing and textiles (Dicken 1992).
Secondly, 'later' industrialisers, if they are to 'catch-up' with countries
already in the race, have usually not only to learn existing methods of
production, but to improve upon them. It is wrong to assume, as industrial
society theory does or recent advocates of new production paradigms do,
that there is only one, modern, advanced form of production to emulate a simple catch-up view of industrialisation. For, as Dore (1973) and
others have shown, lateness allows for combined and uneven development,

strategic alliances, the skipping of stages, installation and modification
of dominant systems, and greater state or strategic direction to work
organisation. Late industrialisers, if they are to enter world markets as
autonomous players, cannot rely on small-scale, decentralised change
agencies because the point on the scale of capitalist development they are
entering does not permit this. Instead of small entrepreneurs, collective
forces such as states, large-firm/state blocs, or international institutions
are more likely to direct change. Dore (1973) noted how late industrialisers, such as Japan, created institutions of formal education which
segmented and disciplined the labour force prior to industrialisation; how
giant firms structured formal education and training institutions to suit
their needs; and how organisations took precedence over market methods
of regulation. Economic nationalism and a greater role for the state are also
apparent.
A simple early-late dichotomy, of itself, is not helpful as, after Britain, all
societies were 'late' industrialisers; and discussing 'degrees' of lateness
cannot be sufficiently discriminating to be analytically meaningful. Is a very
late industrialiser different from a not-so-late one? However, the developmental aspect of industrialisation at an international level does present
structural constraints for societies. In particular, the mechanisms of industrialisation and diffusion of 'best practice' are affected by timing. In the
twentieth century, especially the latter part, trans-national corporations
have played an active role in transferring 'best practice' between countries.
It was within TNCs that Japanese methods transferred to the U.S. and
Britain, although not in a straightforward way (Kenney and Florida 1993;
Elger and Smith 1994). The American firm of McKinsey & Co. were
responsible for reorganising managerial structures and the divisionalisation
(M-form) of over half of the top one hundred companies in Britain in the
1960s (Chandler 1990: 615). However, again there may be adaptation of
the M-form to British conditions, and not a replica of one 'best practice'
(Kogut and Parkinson 1993: 191).Uttler (1982) has highlighted the role of
international consultancies and multi-national companies in helping to
diffuse versions ofTaylorism into Britain in the 1920s and 1930s- see also
Kogut and Parkinson (1993) - and Stopford and Turner (1985) have
discussed the way U.S. management and personnel practices were diffused
to Britain by American subsidiaries ofTNCs.
Countries can be slotted into commodity chains relative to societal
endowments, and have their comparative superiority and inferiority reinforced. Although, as a recent paper on changes in the hierarchy of
production chains between Japanese-owned American and Mexican electrical assembly factories makes clear, relations along production chains are
dynamic 'constantly evolving spatial divisions of labor' and not fixed by a
country's institutional competitive advantages (Kenney and Florida 1994:
38). The international division of labour, while facilitating the diffusion of

practices, also puts limits on them. Moreover, not all developing countries
can be like South Korea or Taiwan, for example, as these export-oriented
industrialisers have been marked by dominance - as colonies of Japan, and
cold-war sites of super-power struggles - which makes them relatively
unique (Corbridge 1985). Aside from the way they integrate into the
international economy and their societal histories, we could also say that
their success limits their utility - dozens of Koreas would create severe
dislocation in free trade, as even the limited penetration of the U.S. market
by these newly industrialised countries has caused tariffs to be imposed on
their exports, which has forced internationalisation of production of Asian
fashion clothing companies to central America (within open access of the
U.S. market) and directly into developed countries (McDermott 1992; Belo
and Rosenfield 1992).
Dominance effects complicate our understanding of the diversity of work
organisation: either as model or force, the ability of a dominant power to
command is, in the end, limited by the structural forces shaping global
capitalism. The effects of combined and uneven development means that
the role of 'dominant' state, sector or company as standard-maker rotates
between societies. 'Best practices' therefore become infused with the
cultural contingencies of each new dominant state, which in turn complicates convergence pressures. Emphasising the national origins of 'best
practices' - as in examples of Americanisation, Japanisation or
Germanisation, - can be used to block their application in other countries.
The export of British practices to the U.S., Australia or other countries was
ultimately linked to and limited by the place of Britain within the pecking
order of capitalist countries. If we take the example of the social production
of engineers, then the Canadian case illustrates this process. Initially
Canadian engineers were produced along British lines, with apprenticeships and an elite professional association. Britain, through colonial influence and world economic power, provided both model and external force
in Canada. However, Canadian industrialisation was late and came under
the influence of American 'best practice' which, in the formation of
engineers, meant university training and partial credentialism. British
practice no-longer articulated with the industrial realities of the type of
capitalism Canada was entering. In other words, Britain's colonial influence
offered a model of engineering organisation, but this proved incongruent
with the prevailing conditions of industrial capitalism Canada was entering,
and as such, Canadian practice was modelled more on its rising dominant
southern neighbour (Millward 1988; Smith, 1990).
In conclusion then, we are saying that 'best practice' is part of a larger
reality, and that it is the international economic system which ultimately
structures the constitution of what is best practice and shapes patterns of its
diffusion. This system has both convergence and divergence dynamics. Thus
it does create pressures to diffuse best practice, but competition between

dominant countries means there is never a single model of this, and uneven
development ensures that there is a turnover in practices. Moreover the
international division oflabour, and increasing integration of production on
a global scale, means countries must differ from each other in certain ways;
this acts against the global adoption of dominant standards and, hence,
convergence.

How Deep do 'Best Practices' Go?
Several doubts can be raised against giving prominence to the role of best
practice in shaping work organisation. First, it could be argued that such
borrowing is superficial, affecting only the firm level and not the institutional arrangements of the state or civil society. Second, it might be that
whatever is witnessed in other societies by 'significant' actors - corporate
managers, civil servants or others - cannot simply be imposed in their 'own'
society or firm, due to the commitment to or embeddedness of existing
practices. Thirdly, it might be that any new standard will inevitably become
diluted or adapted by host institutions and agencies, producing
a multiplicity of national versions of ostensible 'best practices' such,_ as
Taylorism, Fordism, M-form or ]IT. As such, we would be back to
institutional cultural pluralism, and not universal ways of organising.
In reply to these objections we would accept that the workplace, especially
the manufacturing workplace, has been the target for 'best practice', and
shaping the wider institutional nature of a society with such state
programmes as, say, corporatism or privatisation, is more problematic. Yet.
while recognising that international benchmarks affect all levels, it is
obviously the case that recasting institutional systems is more complex than
adjusting factory regimes. As such, the factory or organisational levels may
be more dynamic and variable, relative to social institutions of the state and
civil society. On the second question, our argument takes on the central
issue of transmission and implementation, and acknowledges that international standards are separate from the manner of their execution, which
can only be explored empirically and not a priori. The question of agency at
social institution and organisational level is clearly central to the issue of
transfer and borrowing, and the firm may be more dynamic, subject to more
central direction and therefore able to more quickly absorb best practices,
relative to social institutions, but this clearly depends on the strength of the
new relative to existing practices. Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) mention the
selective transfer of 'bits of JIT' into U.K. manu- facturing firms emulating
Japanese practices.
On the related third objection we also recognise how mediation creates
adaptations and variation, and it is central to our argument that comparative cross-national research should explore interaction between the

three levels, and not the superiority of one over the other. Abo (1994),
discussing the transfer of Japanese production and management practices
into the U.S., speaks of the 'application-adaptation dilemma' to reinforce
the fact that Japanese practices remain attached to Japanese social institutions and social relations, and cannot be readily decontextualised and
applied to a different social and economic context, but rather need
adaptation, which can dilute their competitive advantage (hence the
dilemma of transfer for Japanese companies) and create 'hybrid' factory
regimes. We would also add that Japanese firms are more likely to actively
sponsor the partial transfer of practices along their global commodity chain
and, therefore, strategically position practices to suit local labour markets,
product markets and so on (Elger and Smith 1994). In other words, the firm
may more strategically interact and shape host environments, as well as be
subject to the pressures to conform to conditions within particular
countries. As Abo (1994: 16) notes, 'if the Japanese production system does
establish a clear superiority over other systems, then within certain parameters, it will spread to other countries. However the degree to which it
permeates a given society will be governed by conditions in that society'.
We can explore this interaction through an example, the construction and
diffusion of Taylorism. It developed as a reaction to the dominance of
British capital, against British craft practices, within a high wage immigrant
economy, with mass markets and a particular system of standardised
American manufacture (Merkel 1980; Nelson 1975; Montgomery 1979;
Clark 1987). Despite these special conditions, Taylorism, once developed,
was promoted as a universal ('scientific management'), not distinctively
American, way of organising. In its diffusion, however, its origins continued
to be used as a reason to limit its value: British engineers and managers
resisted it as inappropriate for Britain, and it was viewed as an 'American'
system (Littler 1982; Kogut and Parkinson 1993). It was not until the
extension ofU.S. mass production technology, growth in the size of markets
and spread of U.S. corporations that Taylorism migrated beyond America
(Littler 1982): Europe had to 'catch-up' with American economic
conditions. With the passage of time, the competitive advantage of the
methods and the creation of a layer of diffusion agents - industrial engineers, management academics, consultants - Taylorism lost its national
status and entered textbooks as a universal practice. This was because it was
not simply an American capitalist ideology - a cultural contingent - but a
way of organising from a dominant state, hence one tied to capitalist
advance, and by capitals with the power to intemationalise, diffuse and
impose their 'solutions' on other nations. There is always an inter-meshing
and contradiction between society, system and dominance elements within
these 'best practices', but the ascendancy of the different levels varies
according to period and location. Understanding this interaction is central
to comparative analysis, and we will discuss this in our conclusion.

Conclusion: Between System, Society and Dominance
An economic system, such as capitalism, provides both a common and, at
the same time, special experience for workers and managers, diversity being
produced by its mode of arrival, timing and structural configuration within
particular nations. Societies contain patterns and structures which have an
embedded distinctiveness and observable effects on the organisation of
work and management. Societies, however, cannot reproduce uniqueness
unconstrained by the general forces of capital accumulation and globalisation, or what we have identified as competitive pressures created by the
efficiency standards or 'best practices' of dominant states. In other words,
the three broad levels of influence derived from society, system and
dominance effects interact within the social relations of the firm.
System effects create the internal dynamics and problems to which
managers and workers respond. They offer recurrent themes characteristic
of capitalist society, and structure the crises that affect which is to be the
dominant economic power. Society effects create the context (institutional
and cultural) within which the system problems are solved or tackled.
Society effects are also conditioned in important ways by the articulation of
the system, for example, when and how a country became capitalist.
Dominance effects may override or combine with local culture to reshape
institutions. They may present new solutions to system problems, for
example fresh ways of organising assembly lines, the division of labour or
relationship between manual and mental labour. Dominance, in turn, is
conditioned by the system - by the tendency for ongoing re-alignment of
economic powers within global capitalism. Also, the extent to which, and
the manner in which, innovations are transferred depends on the nature of
the relationships between transferor and transferee, that is, on their relative
positions in the global system. The system establishes which problems need
to be solved through borrowing - no agency is attracted to an innovation
that doesn't address a real problem. The key point, then, is that all three
levels are linked: it is not a matter of either/or. Moreover, the levels are
unstable and mobile, structured by internal contradictions and dynamics.
When making comparisons between societies in, for example, the utilisation of new technology, organisation of work, structure of industrial
relations procedures or management styles, we should be aware of the
inherent tendency to freeze social action within the discourse of national
differences. This is especially true when examining 'factory regimes'management and labour process organisation at firm level - because this
level, as opposed to institutions of the state or public sector, is particularly
dynamic and variegated. This may be all the greater in those countries where
the autonomy of the firm from the state (but not the capital markets) is
more pronounced, as in the U.S. and Great Britain. As Whitley (1994: 120)
has noted, firms from 'economies with more pluralist or fragmented

institutional arrangements, whose ownership and acnvtnes are spread
between a variety of differently organised economies, are more likely to
develop nationally 'deviant' qualities as a result of operating in different
contexts'. Whereas firms from strongly integrated and successful economies
may carry over national character to subsidiaries when locating abroad,
and transfer home country practices rather than adopt the practices
encountered in the host economy.
The character of the host economy and its relative openness or receptiveness to dominant 'best practice' varies historically as well as structurally. The
heterogeneous 'factory regimes' in Britain, with its concentration of
multi-national companies and generally more cosmopolitan economic
structure, is evidence of the weakness of state regulation of capital and
increased constraints upon labour during the last decade. This has had its
effect. For example, whereas the timing of American companies' arrival in
Britain meant they largely had to conform to its multi-union environment,
methods of payment, industrial relations customs and practice or pay the
price of non-unionism through high wages, the same cannot be said for
recent Japanese entrants. These latter companies, through collusion with a
declining and fiercely competitive trade union movement and a strong state
keen to attract foreign investment, have forced major concessions and
changes on this 'environment'. Had Japanese capital arrived earlier, their
factory regimes would be more typically British. The timing of their arrival
allowed them to impose a labour process and industrial relations system
suited to their interests (Reitsperger 1986). Moreover, these conditions also
permitted British 'adopters' of Japanese 'best practice' to push through
change on the shop floor more thoroughly, or at least forcefully, than would
have been the case in earlier periods. As such, we could say that dominance
effects have been stronger than societal contingencies in the instance of
Japanese transplants (Elger and Smith 1994). Similar claims could be made
for the impact of Japanese transplants in the U.S. motor industry (Kenney
and Florida 1991), although, in electronics, Milkman (1992) found more
evidence of Japanese transplants consciously adopting American anti-union
'human resource management' practices, because of their economic efficacy, and dominance as the best practice in this sector. Florida and Kenney
(1994) in a recent paper on Japanese maquiladoraS found they exhibited
nothing (apart from company uniforms) of the traits and practices associated with Japanese core plants, but rather conformed to conditions typical
of the temporary, subcontracting sector in Japan, thus demonstrating the
power of sector constraints over national contingencies.
At the level of the firm we may also want to make the distinction between
the competing influences of society, system and dominance effects, and
suggest that social agents within the firm are differentially exposed to these
pressures. Corporate managers in international sectors will be more open to
'best practice' and different national ways of managing. Research and

development engineers will make trips to overseas competitors, equipment
suppliers or international conferences, and to exhibitions which introduce
them to 'best practice' and societally distinct ways of organising. Now, while
the identification of 'best practice' is not straightforward, and is particularly
troublesome across borders (Kogut 1993: 5), and the market in techniques,
quick fixes and the general commodification of management ideas
complicates selection, nevertheless, some managers are more likely to
champion than to resist 'best practice'. Such agents may be a source of
diffusion of dominant 'best practice', but will compete against others (trade
unions and production management, for example) who may be more
defensive of traditional custom and practice derived from the national
arena. In a recent study of the restructuring of a large confectionery
company, this differential integration of managers and workers in competing ways of organising, supported diverse rather than linear influences on
reorganisation and change of work organisation within this company
(Smith, Child and Rowlinson 1990).
Instead of restricting the influences on work organisation to what is drawn
from the national or international economy, comparative research needs to
examine the particular pattern of interaction between the three influences
of society, system and dominance. Moreover, rather than treat- ing the firm
as the recipient of culturally specific and non-specific inputs, it is preferable
to examine it as differentially embedded within, and as agency shaping the
effects of, these three levels.
Finally, while we have separated, for heuristic purposes, society, system
and dominance effects, in practice such a division may be rather artificial.
Intercourse between the 'levels', and mutual reinforcement, may make it
difficult meaningfully to isolate their relative influence. There may also be,
as we have insisted throughout this paper, a tendency for practices drawn
from the particular levels to metamorphose from being treated as, say, a
societal contingent into being a system requirement. Taylorism, as we noted
earlier, was initially bounded by the constraints of American capitalism; but
its diffusion transformed it into a 'best practice' which was seen as
a 'system' requirement in some economies. The institutionalisation of
Taylorism through engineering departments, business schools, and countless factories in a number of advanced societies gave it this 'systemic'
quality, and allowed critics of it, Braverman (197 4) and others, to confuse
it as a capitalist ideology par excellence. The identification ofTaylorism with
American economic success made it difficult to resist. Disentangling the
three influences of society, system and dominance has always been part of
the critique of Taylorism as it became a dominant ideology and started to
diffuse to Europe and Japan; but we could say that it was only with the
emergence of other dominant capitalist states, in Europe and Japan, that
such a critique has been able to separate these levels, and identify what in
Taylorism is specific to America, what is part of capitalism, and what held

sway only through American economic hegemony and not for intrinsic
qualities ofTaylorism itself (Aoki 1988).
The complexities of cross-national studies are increasing because we
can no-longer assume stable institutions, traditions and practices within
'nation' states. Globalisation of production is integrating organisations into
logic's other than those given by national institutions and is facilitating more
rapid learning and diffusion of new or 'best practice' from dominant
societies. The co-existence of several dominant states strengthens pluralism
and eclecticism, and global competition and crises add to the problems of
comparative research. This paper has presented a method to analyse these
contradictory dynamics and hopefully avoid the major problems we have
identified with institutionalist and other approaches to cross-national
analysis.
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Notes
1. We are grateful to Arndt Sorge for this phrase.
2. Maquiladoras are the Mexican border industrialisation programmes to attract
U.S. companies for labour-intensive production activities which utilise cheap
Mexican labour for export to the U.S. market (Sklair 1991: 103)
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